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2.1 Data Overview
In this paper, we investigate 252 unique daily snapshots of the Orange County Voter Registration
dataset, beginning April 26, 2018, and ending May 24, 2019. Altogether, they cover 89% of
business days (weekdays). Each snapshot consists of roughly 1.5 million voters. We continue to
receive daily snapshots of the OC dataset in the 2020 cycle.
2.2 Why Orange County?
Orange County (California) is a large and diverse county in Southern California. Located south of
Los Angeles and north of San Diego, Orange County is home to a wide array of different business,
colleges and universities, and of course, Disneyland. The county currently has a total population
of almost 3.2 million residents, and in the 2016 presidential election, Orange County had just
over 2 million voting-eligible citizens, with approximately 1.5 million registered voters California
Secretary of State (2016). In that same election, 1.2 million of those registered voters participated
(80.7% of registered voters). Orange County’s population is also diverse, as the U.S. Census
Bureau’s most recent estimates show that 72% of the county’s population is White, 21% Asian, 2%
African-American, and 3.5% two or more races. The Census Bureau’s recent data estimates that
34% of the Orange County’s population is Hispanic or Latino United States Census Bureau (2017).
Thus, one reason we focus on Orange County for this study is that it is one of the largest and most
diverse election jurisdictions in the United States.
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Secondly, Orange County is widely viewed as an innovator in the administration of elections.
The County’s Registrar of Voters, Neal Kelley, participates widely in state and national professional
organizations, and is has been recognized for his innovative administrative practices. Under his
administration, Orange County has developed many administrative processes and tools that are
viewed as best practices for election administration. These innovations include, for example,
building transparency by webcasting in real time virtually all aspects of the process of administering
an election, or more recently, pilot testing risk-limiting audits.
2.3 Data Availability
Upon publication, all of the code necessary to produce the analyses reported in our paper will
be available on the GitHub repository along with an example dataset with synthetic
voter information. Due to the confidential nature of the voter registration data, and our data access
agreement with OCROV, we cannot share or post publicly the data used in this study. Researchers
who want to use these data can request access from the Orange County Registrar of Voters.
2.4 Data Dictionary
The voter file “snapshots” that we have received from the OCROV contain the fields described
below. The number in parentheses describe the number of unique values for each field,1 based on
the snapshot of May 21, 2018, the registration deadline for the June 2018 primaries. The snapshot
consists of 1,478,541 observations.
Here we provide a data dictionary and the number of unique values in each of the sixty-two
data fields.2 Many of the variables are created internally by the Orange County Registrar of Voters
for their usage; our interest is mostly limited to variables that contain direct inputs from the voters.
These variables of interest are listed in the Appendix in Table 2 with summary statistics.3 Although
the Registrar assigns each voter with a unique ID (lVoterUniqueID) that is not duplicated in any
of the daily snapshots, not all voters are distinct entities.
In Orange County, the voter registration forms ask the voter for both the California Driver’s
License number (or a California Identification card number) and the last four digits of the Social
Security Number (SSN) Orange County Registrar of Voters (2018b). However, these are not strictly
1The numbers are based on raw text, so that for instance, “MISS” and “Miss” are counted as distinct values.
2Note that the canonical text cleaning and standardizing precedes both the calculations of number of unique entries
and the occurrence of the most frequent entries, such as stripping the string of non-alphanumeric entries, trimming
white-spaces, and case normalizing, except for email addresses, which may be case sensitive and in which certain
punctuation creates meaningful differences.
3We exclude mailing addresses due to the fact that it usually overlaps with physical, residential address. We also
excluded reported place of birth as it seems to frequently be misreported, and the reported place of birth changes
frequently in the data.
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required. If neither of them can be provided, a voter may be assigned a unique ID number solely
for registration purposes (Orange County Registrar of Voters, 2018a). Despite these seemingly
unique identifiers, duplicates still can be found in the database. Indeed, deduplication based on
exact matching on these identifiers—the most basic of deduplication efforts—is already performed
by the OCROV.
• “lVoterUniqueID” (1,478,541): Interally assigned voter identification number.
• “sAffNumber” (1,478,540): An identifier of the voter registration affidavit.
• “szStateVoterID" (1): The voter identification number assigned by the Secretary of State’s Office to the record.
• “sVoterTitle” (10): Title (e.g., “Dr.”, “Mrs.”) provided by the voter.
• “szNameLast” (188,734): Last name.
• “szNameFirst” (89,985): First name.
• “szNameMiddle” (52,085): Middle name.
• “sNameSuffix” (23): Name suffix.
• “sGender” (3): Gender.
• “szSitusAddress” (787,043): Address.
• “szSitusCity” (48): City.
• “sSitusState” (1): State.
• “sSitusZip” (94): Zip Code.
• “sHouseNum” (30,269): House number.
• “sUnitAbbr” (20): House unit abbreviation.
• “sUnitNum” (14,780): House unit number.
• “szStreetName” (17,437): Street name.
• “sStreetSuffix” (95): Street suffix.
• “sPreDir” (9): Direction prefix.
• “sPostDir” (5): Direction suffix.
• “szMailAddress1” (807,272): Mailing address (street address).
• “szMailAddress2” (22,249): Mailing address (city, state, and zip code).
• “szMailAddress3” (2,271): Mailing address (overseas voters’ street address).
• “szMailAddress4” (195): Mailing address (overseas voters’ country of residence).
• “szMailZip” (13,425): Mailing Zip Code.
• “szPhone” (706,711): Telephone number.
• “szEmailAddress” (452,610): Email address.
• “dtBirthDate” (30,468): Date of birth.
• “sBirthPlace” (30,468): Place of birth.
• “dtRegDate” (15,762): Registration record date.
• “dtOrigRegDate” (16,477): Original registration date.
3
• “dtLastUpdate_dt” (6,984): Update of record.
• “sStatusCode” (1): Status of record.
• “szStatusReasonDesc” (110): Description of record status.
• “sUserCode1” (7,370): (Unknown)
• “sUserCode2” (13): (Unknown)
• “iDuplicateIDFlag” (4): Potential duplicate ID flag.
• “szLanguageName” (1): Language.
• “szPartyName” (46): Party registration.
• “szAVStatusAbbr” (12): Absentee status abbreviation.
• “szAVStatusDesc” (12): Absentee status description.
• “szPrecinctName” (53): Precinct name.
• “sPrecinctID” (1,487): Precinct ID.
• “sPrecinctPortion” (8): Precinct portion.
• “sDistrictID_0” (1): Geographic district identifier (0: County).
• “iSubDistrict_0” (1): Geographic district (0: County).
• “szDistrictName_0” (1): Geographic district name (0: County).
• “sDistrictID_1” (7): Geographic district identifier (1: Congressional district).
• “iSubDistrict_1” (1): Geographic district (1: Congressional district).
• “szDistrictName_1” (7): Geographic district name (1: Congressional district).
• “sDistrictID_2” (5): Geographic district identifier (2: Senate district).
• “iSubDistrict_2” (1): Geographic district (2: Senate district).
• “szDistrictName_2” (5): Geographic district name (2: Senate district).
• “sDistrictID_3” (7): Geographic district identifier (3: Assembly district).
• “iSubDistrict_3” (1): Geographic district (3: Assembly district).
• “szDistrictName_3” (7): Geographic district name (3: Assembly district).
• “sDistrictID_4” (5): Geographic district identifier (4: Supervisorial district).
• “iSubDistrict_4” (1): Geographic district (4: Supervisorial district).
• “szDistrictName_4” (5): Geographic district name (4: Supervisorial district).
• “sDistrictID_5” (35): Geographic district identifier (5: City council ward division).
• “iSubDistrict_5” (9): Geographic district (5: City council ward division).
• “szDistrictName_5” (68): Geographic district name (5: City council ward division).
2.5 Hypothetical Changes to the Database
Figure 1 shows synthetic examples of changes in the voter file. They can also represent examples
of duplicates in the file.
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Figure 1: Number of Records Per Day
Name Address Birth Date ContactFirst Middle Last Street Address City Phone Email
Steven B Smith 110 S East Ave Brea 04/26/1980 714-765-3300 N/A
Steven Smith 110 S East Ave Brea 04/26/1980 714-765-3300 smith@ex
Isidor Agnes 99 6th St #72 Tustin 07/13/1960 N/A N/A
Jsidor Agne 99 6th St #72 Tustin 07/13/1960 714-205-8583 N/A
Anna Clara Zhang 203 Coast Ln Tustin 12/01/1950 N/A acz@ex
Anna C Zhang 101 Sunny Blvd Brea 12/10/1950 N/A acz@ex
Table 1: Synthetic Examples of Changes in Voter Files
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2.6 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 show the total number of observations in the voter registration database by date. As can
be seen, the daily snapshots were generated on business days (weekdays). There are a few missing
snapshots—while the Orange County Registrar of Voters have made incredible contributions by
providing us with daily snapshots, when they were busy, we were unable to obtain some snapshots.
In addition, as aforementioned, Table 2 shows the data summary for some important user-
entered variables. This shows how data-intensive each field is, showing the amount of missing
data for the important fields, and the number of unique and most frequent entries. For instance, the
name suffix has too much missing data and too few unique entries to be very informative. Political
party, although an important variable, is likewise not informative for matching.
Table 2: Data Summary by Field of May 21 Snapshot
Category Field Number ofUnique Entries
Number of
Most Freq. Entry Number Missing Examples
Name
First 89,984 21,481 78 Jane
Middle 51,609 83,035 406,428 E
Last 188,734 26,385 0 Doe
Title (Name Prefix) 5 466,043 488,123 Ms.
Name Suffix 18 16,430 1,452,055 Jr.
Address
Street Address 786,224 93 0 1300 S Grand Ave Unit 101
City 48 140,081 0 Santa Ana
Zip Code 94 40,128 0 92705
Date of Birth 30,467 124 23 March 11, 1989
Place of Birth 319 678,187 60,999 CA
Gender 3 2,274 1,474,151 F
Political Party 46 540,859 0 No Party Preference
Contact Phone 706,710 9,035 663,105 (714) 567-7600Email 452,609 382 1,018,894 jane@roc.ocgov.com
3 Parameter and Variable Selection in Record Linkage
A recap of the probabilistic record linkage framework, which forms the basis of our analysis, is in
Figure 2. The two density distributions show match probability by the latent status of a true match.
If the match is a “true negative,” i.e, the entities are not the same voter, the match probability is
likely lower than when the match is a “true positive.” However, due to chance, some fields such as
names or address may coincide, resulting in an overlapping region. A researcher typically decides
upon a lower and upper cutoff of the match probability to classify the record pairs into nonmatches,
matches, and those that must be clerically reviewed. Note that for the final composite match
probability, we have to calculate each fields’ agreement levels and weight it using its frequency
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Figure 2: The Framework of Probabilistic Record Linkage
distribution.
3.1 String Distance Metrics and Threshold
In this Section we briefly explore how we chose the parameters in record linkage. As we have
aforementioned in the main text, we use R and its CRAN package fastLink. While there are
many different options in fastLink, the following are major parameters of choice: the choice of
the string distance metric (stringdist.method), and the cutoff threshold that declares a match
(threshold.match). The first determines the spectrum of the agreement between two strings.
The second determines the lower cutoff for a match classification—that is, in Figure 2, we only use
a single cutoff for simplicity, not leaving any records for clerical review.
The default values of each are respectively the Jaro-Winkler string distance metric and a
threshold of 0.85. We test out the following combination of string metric-threshold parameters:
c(Jaro-Winkler,Levenshtein distance) × c(0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95)
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While we do not have a gold standard—i.e., true match status—when matching between snap-
shots, we have a good alternative for it, which is the internal ID assigned within the OCROV.
Assuming that it is the true match status, we can employ the following canonical performance
measurements in record linkage: pairwise precision, pairwise recall, and F1 score. For details on
the string distance measures and the performance metrics, refer to Christen (2012).
The followings are the performance matrices for the twelve parameter combinations, using the
variables mentioned in the main text.
No. String Metric Threshold Precision Recall F1
1 Jaro-Winkler 0.70 0.9433 0.9939 0.9657
2 Jaro-Winkler 0.75 0.9364 0.9970 0.9672
3 Jaro-Winkler 0.80 0.9343 0.9970 0.9659
4 Jaro-Winkler 0.85 0.9429 0.9873 0.9600
5 Jaro-Winkler 0.90 0.9360 0.9972 0.9671
6 Jaro-Winkler 0.95 0.9377 0.9937 0.9659
7 Levenshtein 0.70 0.9386 0.9793 0.9514
8 Levenshtein 0.75 0.9356 0.9623 0.9487
9 Levenshtein 0.80 0.9306 0.9689 0.9427
10 Levenshtein 0.85 0.9342 0.9970 0.9659
11 Levenshtein 0.90 0.9397 0.9873 0.9671
12 Levenshtein 0.95 0.9256 0.9524 0.9290
Table 3: Performance Evaluation for String Distance Metric and Threshold Choices
Note that because the internal ID may be inconsistent, some of the matches that are classified
as false are true matches. There are no cases vice versa to our knowledge, i.e., cases where two
people share the same internal voter ID. Hence pairwise precision is slightly undervalued, and as
a result the F1 score. We still use F1 score as our final metric for tuning as it is a harmonic mean
between precision and recall.
In the grid that we explored, it seems to be the case that the Jaro-Winkler string metric combined
with a threshold value of 0.75 works best. Note that the threshold value of choice is lower than
the default value in Enamorado et al. (2018). Also note that while 0.75 works best when the string
distance metric is fixed to Jaro-Winkler, 0.90 works best when the metric is Levenshtein distance.
When the threshold value is fixed at 0.85, Levenshtein distance performs better. While we have
chosen optimal parameters, this also is a cautionary tale in applying record linkage in other datasets
and other domains.
3.2 Variable Selection
Another choice that the researcher should make when employing probabilistic record linkage is to
choose which variables to perform the matching on. This depends substantially on the dataset’s
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existing variables and the dataset’s size. Our first intuition was the 7th combination of variables:
first name, last name, date of birth, street number, and zip code. We test the performance for adding
or deleting variables from this combination, using the tuned parameters from above.
No. Variables Precision Recall F1
1 First name, middle name, last name, date of birth, street number, zip code 0.9648 0.6237 0.7529
2 First name, last name, date of birth, street number, street name, zip code 0.9383 0.8190 0.8744
3 First name, last name, date of birth, street number, house number, zip code 0.9411 0.1864 0.3203
4 First name, last name, date of birth, street number, street name, house number, zip code 0.9366 0.1884 0.3206
5 First name, last name, date of birth, full street address, zip code 0.9354 0.8493 0.8874
6 First name, last name, date of birth, gender, street number, zip code 0.9432 0.9106 0.9264
7 First name, last name, date of birth, street number, zip code 0.9364 0.9970 0.9672
8 First name, date of birth, street number, zip code 0.9219 0.9843 0.9593
9 Last name, date of birth, street number, zip code 0.9313 0.9832 0.9605
10 First name, last name, street number, zip code 0.9334 0.9595 0.9516
11 First name, last name, date of birth, zip code 0.9361 0.9682 0.9542
12 First name, last name, date of birth, street number 0.9361 0.9684 0.9654
Table 4: Performance Evaluation for Variable Choices
The initial combination of choice seems to be indeed most optimal in terms of the F1 score.
The next-best choice seems to be using only the street number. Note that adding variables seem
to cause much more damage by creating false negatives and decreasing the recall. Precision is
relatively robust. Regardless, hence our choice of variables used to match snapshots is the seventh
set of variables.
4 Duplication Detection
4.1 Setup
The cheapest duplicate detection methods are often exact matches that are rule-based Hernandez
& Stolfo (1998), i.e., a researcher defines specifically what a match is—for instance, a match may
be declared when first name, last name, date of birth, and residing city are exact matches. With
fuzzy matches, we can reduce computational costs by blocking to reduce comparison pairs as
aforementioned. However, the choice of rules or blocks both requires extensive “domain-specific
expertise” as the literature puts it, which makes it difficult to automate the selection, and has room
for arbitrary choices. The procedure here describes an automated measure to lessen this problem,
but the initial choice of variables do need some knowledge about the data, as aforementioned in the
main text.
We use a combination of two or three of the following variables:
• Last name
• First name
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• Date of birth
• Residential address (part): Street number, street name, zip code
• Phone number
• Email address
In addition, we give the following variations: for all combinations with first names, generate
blocks that substitute first name for gender, and for all combinations with address (part), generate
blocks that substitute street number and street name for a full single string of street address, including
directions and unit numbers. The rationale is that the OCROV data contains very little information
in the existing gender field, so that gender is largely inferred from first names, given prefixes, and
a few scattered entries of exiting ‘sGender’. Hence including both made little sense. The latter is
motivated by the fact that apartment numbers are often missing and street directions as well (e.g.
North, South, East, West). The full street address contains the parts of the addresses. Moreover,
we include two blocks of single variables: address (part) and address (full). On the other hand,
we leave out gender-last name block, because the blocks were too big and crashed the available
computation resources when computed in a 320G memory.
This leaves us with seventy-one blocks to be tested. Generation of blocks were performed with
CRAN package RecordLinkage, as at the beginning of the project, fastLink did not have the
means to preprocessing matches via blocking. Table 5 shows the blocks aligned by reduction ratio.
It also displays the key distribution statistics of the block sizes (the minimum is always 1), the
number of blocks (i.e., unique values), and the number of non-missing occurrences.
Table 5: Cost Comparison for Blocks: Pre-Matching, April 26 Snapshot
Block Size Distribution
No. Variables Non-missingObs.
Number of
Blocks Q1 Q2 Q3 Max
Number of
Comparisons
Reduction
Ratio (%)
1 First name, Date of birth, Email 30.7% 449,848 1 1 1 2 8 99.9999999996
2 First name, Date of birth, Phone 54.4% 797,257 1 1 1 2 18 99.9999999992
3 First name, Phone, Email 22.3% 326,703 1 1 1 2 19 99.9999999991
4 Gender, Date of birth, Email 28.8% 421,535 1 1 1 2 23 99.9999999989
5 Date of birth, Phone, Email 22.3% 326,703 1 1 1 2 26 99.9999999988
6 Last name, Date of birth, Email 30.7% 449,839 1 1 1 2 31 99.9999999986
7 First name, Date of birth, Address (full) 100.0% 1,464,891 1 1 1 2 42 99.9999999980
8 First name, Address (full), Email 30.7% 449,806 1 1 1 2 55 99.9999999974
9 First name, Date of birth, Address (part) 99.9% 1,463,820 1 1 1 2 56 99.9999999974
10 Date of birth, Address (full), Email 30.7% 449,814 1 1 1 2 56 99.9999999974
11 Date of birth, Address (part), Email 30.7% 449,324 1 1 1 2 57 99.9999999973
12 Last name, First name, Email 30.7% 449,803 1 1 1 2 58 99.9999999973
13 First name, Address (part), Email 30.7% 449,314 1 1 1 2 58 99.9999999973
14 Date of birth, Email 30.7% 449,802 1 1 1 2 68 99.9999999968
15 First name, Email 30.7% 449,777 1 1 1 2 84 99.9999999961
16 Gender, Date of birth, Phone 51.1% 747,693 1 1 1 2 215 99.9999999900
17 Last name, First name, Date of birth 100.0% 1,464,693 1 1 1 3 241 99.9999999888
18 Last name, Date of birth, Phone 54.4% 797,014 1 1 1 3 291 99.9999999864
19 Date of birth, Address (full), Phone 54.4% 796,952 1 1 1 3 353 99.9999999836
20 Date of birth, Address (part), Phone 54.4% 796,366 1 1 1 3 363 99.9999999831
21 Gender, Phone, Email 20.9% 305,835 1 1 1 4 409 99.9999999809
22 Date of birth, Phone 54.4% 796,882 1 1 1 3 423 99.9999999803
23 Last name, Gender, Email 28.8% 420,860 1 1 1 4 734 99.9999999658
24 Last name, First name, Phone 54.4% 796,522 1 1 1 3 764 99.9999999644
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25 First name, Address (full), Phone 54.4% 796,512 1 1 1 3 775 99.9999999639
26 First name, Address (part), Phone 54.4% 795,919 1 1 1 3 792 99.9999999631
27 First name, Phone 54.4% 796,315 1 1 1 3 972 99.9999999547
28 Gender, Address (full), Email 28.8% 420,590 1 1 1 7 1,035 99.9999999518
29 Gender, Address (part), Email 28.7% 420,083 1 1 1 7 1,073 99.9999999500
30 Gender, Email 28.8% 420,377 1 1 1 7 1,269 99.9999999409
31 Last name, Phone, Email 22.3% 324,807 1 1 1 4 2,004 99.9999999066
32 Gender, Date of birth, Address (full) 94.0% 1,375,275 1 1 1 4 2,024 99.9999999057
33 Address (full), Phone, Email 22.3% 324,368 1 1 1 4 2,488 99.9999998841
34 Address (part), Phone, Email 22.3% 323,943 1 1 1 4 2,543 99.9999998815
35 Gender, Date of birth, Address (part) 93.9% 1,373,733 1 1 1 4 2,565 99.9999998805
36 Phone, Email 22.3% 324,214 1 1 1 4 2,670 99.9999998756
37 Last name, Date of birth, Address (full) 100.0% 1,462,355 1 1 1 4 2,703 99.9999998741
38 Last name, Date of birth, Address (part) 99.9% 1,461,213 1 1 1 4 2,790 99.9999998700
39 Date of birth, Address (full) 100.0% 1,461,602 1 1 1 4 3,462 99.9999998387
40 Last name, Address (full), Email 30.7% 445,404 1 1 1 4 4,673 99.9999997823
41 Date of birth, Address (part) 99.9% 1,459,367 1 1 1 4 4,691 99.9999997814
42 Last name, Address (part), Email 30.7% 444,829 1 1 1 4 4,765 99.9999997780
43 Last name, Email 30.7% 445,117 1 1 1 6 4,995 99.9999997673
44 Address (full), Email 30.7% 443,984 1 1 1 10 6,275 99.9999997076
45 Address (part), Email 30.7% 443,355 1 1 1 10 6,434 99.9999997002
46 Last name, First name, Address (full) 100.0% 1,457,666 1 1 1 3 7,325 99.9999996587
47 Last name, First name, Address (part) 99.9% 1,456,258 1 1 1 4 7,690 99.9999996417
48 First name, Address (full) 100.0% 1,455,598 1 1 1 4 9,454 99.9999995595
49 Last name, Gender, Phone 51.1% 733,684 1 1 1 6 15,292 99.9999992875
50 Gender, Address (full), Phone 51.1% 730,463 1 1 1 18 19,175 99.9999991066
51 Gender, Address (part), Phone 51.0% 729,561 1 1 1 18 19,593 99.9999990871
52 Last name, Gender, Date of birth 94.0% 1,358,093 1 1 1 16 21,173 99.9999990135
53 Gender, Phone 51.1% 724,976 1 1 1 18 25,344 99.9999988192
54 First name, Address (part) 99.9% 1,434,127 1 1 1 17 41,618 99.9999980610
55 Last name, Date of birth 100.0% 1,424,977 1 1 1 20 49,456 99.9999976958
56 Last name, Address (full), Phone 54.4% 728,639 1 1 1 8 75,722 99.9999964720
57 Last name, Address (part), Phone 54.4% 727,208 1 1 1 8 76,695 99.9999964267
58 Last name, Phone 54.4% 723,423 1 1 1 8 82,495 99.9999961565
59 Address (full), Phone 54.4% 710,824 1 1 1 30 98,511 99.9999954102
60 Address (part), Phone 54.4% 708,911 1 1 1 31 100,205 99.9999953313
61 First name, Date of birth 100.0% 1,348,674 1 1 1 8 138,931 99.9999935270
62 Last name, Gender, Address (full) 94.0% 1,220,017 1 1 1 10 181,918 99.9999915242
63 Last name, Gender, Address (part) 93.9% 1,209,649 1 1 1 42 203,839 99.9999905029
64 Gender, Address (full) 94.0% 1,100,303 1 1 1 65 348,869 99.9999837457
65 Last name, Address (full) 100.0% 1,010,761 1 1 2 11 619,849 99.9999711204
66 Last name, Address (part) 99.9% 993,131 1 1 2 95 682,501 99.9999682014
67 Address (full) 100.0% 783,022 1 2 2 94 1,049,036 99.9999511240
68 Last name, First name 100.0% 1,129,285 1 1 1 278 2,598,749 99.9998789209
69 Gender, Address (part) 93.9% 901,372 1 1 2 418 5,779,992 99.9997307026
70 Address (part) 99.9% 596,116 1 2 3 691 13,091,823 99.9993900349
71 Gender, Date of birth 94.0% 58,985 13 25 33 65 20,016,417 99.9990674090
4.2 Assessing Blocks
We then calculate the potential match rate, false positive costs, and finally, after aligning the blocks
by their costs, calculate the cumulative matches to do, as explained. The following Table 6 is a full
version of the Table 2 in the main text.
Table 6: Cost Comparison for Blocks: Pre-Matching, April 26 Snapshot
No. Variables Number ofComparisons Match Rate Cost
Cumulative
Matches To-Do
1 First name, Date of birth, Email 8 87.5% 0.00 8
2 First name, Date of birth, Phone 18 100.0% 0.00 23
3 First name, Phone, Email 19 100.0% 0.00 39
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4 Gender, Date of birth, Email 23 95.7% 0.00 54
5 First name, Date of birth, Address (full) 42 100.0% 0.00 91
6 First name, Address (full), Email 55 100.0% 0.00 128
7 First name, Date of birth, Address (part) 56 100.0% 0.00 142
8 Last name, First name, Email 58 98.3% 0.00 156
9 First name, Address (part), Email 58 100.0% 0.00 159
10 Last name, First name, Date of birth 241 100.0% 0.00 366
11 First name, Address (full), Phone 775 99.9% 0.00 1,122
12 First name, Address (part), Phone 792 99.9% 0.00 1,139
13 Last name, First name, Address (full) 7,325 100.0% 0.00 7,781
14 Last name, First name, Address (part) 7,690 100.0% 0.00 8,132
15 Gender, Date of birth, Phone 215 97.7% 0.02 8,322
16 Gender, Date of birth, Address (full) 2,024 99.8% 0.02 10,128
17 Gender, Date of birth, Address (part) 2,565 99.8% 0.02 10,653
18 Last name, Date of birth, Address (full) 2,703 99.9% 0.02 11,668
19 Last name, Date of birth, Address (part) 2,790 99.9% 0.02 11,695
20 First name, Email 84 90.5% 0.04 11,701
21 Date of birth, Address (full) 3,462 99.8% 0.04 12,123
22 Date of birth, Address (part) 4,691 99.8% 0.04 12,784
23 First name, Address (full) 9,454 99.7% 0.14 14,746
24 Last name, Gender, Email 734 90.3% 0.33 15,413
25 Last name, First name, Phone 764 88.4% 0.41 15,533
26 First name, Phone 972 85.8% 0.63 15,578
27 Gender, Phone, Email 409 59.9% 0.75 15,738
28 Gender, Address (full), Email 1,035 66.8% 1.58 15,975
29 Gender, Address (part), Email 1,073 66.3% 1.66 15,991
30 Gender, Email 1,269 57.3% 2.49 16,085
31 Last name, Gender, Phone 15,292 87.5% 8.80 30,245
32 Last name, Gender, Date of birth 21,173 84.9% 14.65 49,442
33 Gender, Address (full), Phone 19,175 72.1% 24.55 55,284
34 Gender, Address (part), Phone 19,593 71.7% 25.46 55,492
35 Last name, Date of birth 49,456 84.5% 35.21 82,730
36 Gender, Phone 25,344 58.4% 48.38 86,329
37 First name, Address (part) 41,618 47.7% 100.00 118,109
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